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Article 5

Insider Trading and CEO Pay
64 Vand. L. Rev. 505 (2011)
M. Todd Henderson
This Article presents evidence showing that boards of
directors "bargain"with executives about the profits they expect to
make from trades in firm stock. The evidence suggests that
executives whose trading freedom increased using Rule 10b5-1
trading plans experienced reductions in other forms of pay to offset
the potential gains from trading. There are two potential benefits
from trading-portfoliooptimization and informed tradingprofitsand this Article allows us to isolate them. The data show that
boards pay executives in a way that reflects the profits they are
expected to earn from informed trades. It also casts some doubt on
the existence of the incremental value for optimization trades
provided by the Rule.
In addition, this Article explores the legal issues associated
with paying executives from illegal profits. As a matter of policy, the
data seriously undercut criticisms of the laissez-faire view of insider
trading most closely associated with Henry Manne. At least with
respect to classic insider trading (that is, a manager of a firm
trading on the basis of information about the firm where she works),
if boards are taking potential trading profits into consideration
when setting pay, it is difficult to locate potential victims of this
trading. Current shareholders should be at least indifferent to a
deal that pays managers in part out of the hide of future
shareholders. The firm should also internalize any costs arising
from this payment scheme, since future shareholders should take
this into account when deciding whether and at what price to buy
shares. While there still may be good reasons to prohibit some
individuals from trading on material, nonpublic information, the
data make the case for classic insider trading much weaker.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article presents evidence showing that boards of directors
bargain with executives about the profits they expect to make from
informed trades in firm stock. There are two related takeaways. First,
the evidence suggests that executives whose trading freedom is
increased experience reductions in other forms of pay to offset the
potential gains from trading. This result is consistent with (and the
flip side of) a study by Darren Roulstone, finding that firms that
restrict trading increase compensation to offset the lost opportunities
from trading.1 While Roulstone finds that firms restricting trading pay
more, this Article finds that firms liberalizing trading pay less. From
this, we can conclude that boards take executives' ability to trade
profitably in firm stock into account when setting their pay.
Importantly, it is also a two-way street, which should not be
surprising, since if it were not true it would mean that executives are
systematically overpaid, earning more pay when trading is limited but
not earning less when it is freed up. This result is, however,
inconsistent with the managerial power theory of executive
compensation. As discussed below, Lucian Bebchuk and others claim
that executives use trading profits to enrich themselves at the expense
of shareholders. The data presented in this Article call the strong form
2
of this claim into doubt.
Second, the data also suggest that some of the reduction in pay
that boards impose as a result of liberalizing trading opportunities is
to offset expected gains from trades based on material, nonpublic
information. In other words, boards seem to be taking illegal trading
profits into account when setting pay. Roulstone's data and result do
not differentiate between two reasons for why trading freedom is
valuable: the value of liquidity and the value of information
asymmetry. 3 Using a new dataset of firms permitting so-called Rule
10b5-1 trading plans, this Article isolates the informed-trading
component to test whether boards bargain about informed trades.
Firm disclosure choice about Rule 10b5-1 plans provides two groups of
firms that sort by expected trading profits based on informed trades,

1.
Darren Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive
Compensation,41 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 526 (2003) (finding that firms restricting executive trading
(using black-out windows) pay a 4-13% premium in terms of total compensation).
2.
As described below, Bebchuk and others describe the problem of insiders earning
unwarranted and unnoticed profits on informed trades as a systematic problem in need of an
across-the-board regulatory response. See infra Section VI.A.
3.
See Roulstone, supra note 1, at 527-31.
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and this allows us to test whether boards anticipate these profits and
deduct them from executive compensation. The evidence suggests they
do, which speaks not only to theories about how boards set pay but
also to issues of insider-trading policy.
This Article presents the theory and evidence of a new
component of "implicit compensation," that is, the part of
compensation that is not explicitly disclosed to the public but is
nevertheless part of the pay bargain between board and executive.
Regulation of executive compensation generally focuses on the explicit
pay executives receive-be it salary, bonuses, stock options, restricted
stock, perquisites, or deferred compensation, such as retirement
benefits. But since over 60% of total pay is delivered using some form
4
of equity, and insiders trade billions of dollars in stock each year,
there is a missing piece to the pay debate-the compensation insiders
implicitly receive through the ability to convert their equity into cash.
This Article provides new evidence that the size of the insider-trading
component of implicit compensation is significant: for several hundred
firms with active trading by insiders, it amounts, on average, to about
20% of total compensation. At the very least, executive pay as reported
is missing this component.
This Article also considers the implications and legal issues
flowing from the finding that boards appear to bargain with insiders
about expected profits from informed trades. The existence of insidertrading implicit compensation allows us to test theories of board
governance and the intrafirm efficiency of the pay-setting process, as
well as to explore issues of the proper disclosure of executive
compensation and the best available rules for insider trading. As
described below, the Security and Exchange Commission's ("SEC's")
recent attempt to permit insiders to more freely trade for
diversification reasons actually exacerbates any problems that may
arise from implicit compensation. In addition, and contrary to the
claims of the managerial power literature, the data suggest
bargaining about insider-trading profits results in a reduction in pay
that offsets the average expected gains from the trading.
The data also seriously undercut criticisms of the laissez-faire
view of insider trading most closely associated with Henry Manne. 5 In
his famous book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Manne
4.
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson et al., Strategic Disclosure of 10b5-1 Trading Plans (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 411, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1137928 (showing about $25 billion in trades by insiders under
Rule 10b5-1 trading plans in first year of use by each executive).
5.

See HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 147-58 (1966).
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argued that when insiders engage in liberal trading, it improves the
accuracy of stock prices and is the most efficient mechanism for
shareholders to compensate managers. 6 At least with respect to classic
insider trading, 7 if boards are taking potential trading profits into
consideration when setting pay, it is difficult to locate potential
victims of this trading. Current shareholders should be happy with a
deal that pays managers in part out of the hide of future shareholders.
The firm should also internalize any costs arising from this payment
scheme, since future shareholders should take this into account when
deciding whether and at what price to buy shares. While there still
may be good reasons to prohibit some individuals from trading on
material, nonpublic information, these data make the case for classic
insider trading much weaker. And this is consistent with the Supreme
Court's suggestion about one theory of insider trading in United States
v. O'Hagan.8 This and other legal issues are discussed after the
evidence is presented.
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EQuITY COMPENSATION
Firms compensate executives with equity in the firm in order
to reduce agency costs. It is thought that managers who are paid like
shareholders instead of bureaucrats will choose better projects (from
the perspective of shareholders), and be less prone to empire building,
wasteful spending, and shirking.9 Although virtually nonexistent in
public companies just three decades ago, equity compensation is now
the predominate component of executive pay. Over the period of this
study (1999-2008), the average public company executive earned more
than half her total pay in the form of stock options or restricted
stock. 10 Even critics of the current practices of executive compensation
generally support the theory of paying with stock to align the interests
of managers and shareholders."

6.
Id. at 132-33, 136-38.
That is, a manager of a firm trading on the basis of information about the firm where
7.
she works. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).

8.

See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.

9.
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 141.
10. For historical data, see, for example, Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 16-23

(Apr. 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=163914. Data for the
period of this study is from the ExecuComp database maintained by the University of
Pennsylvania.
11. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 8 (2006) ("We agree that paying
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Although paying executives with firm equity may improve
manager behavior, it may also raise other costs for firms. Most
obviously, firms may have to pay more using equity than they would if
using cash. All else being equal, individual executives would prefer
cash, since they can use it to buy other things in addition to shares in
the company. Additionally, the shares that the firms give often come
with limits on when they can be sold. 12 Insiders may need to sell
shares to fund consumption, especially if a large share of their wealth
is tied to firm stock. There is some evidence that consumption-driven
sales often arise on short notice, meaning trading restrictions can be
quite costly. 13 Insiders at the firms restricting trading frequently ask
for permission to trade for liquidity reasons, suggesting that there is a
demand for noninformation trades, which are valuable to executives. 14
This means executives will value the ability to convert shares into
cash, and, in theory, should be compensated for restrictions on their
ability to do this.
Another cost that arises out of paying an executive in stock is
that the executive will have some of her wealth and her human capital
deployed in the same risk environment, resulting in a suboptimal
diversification of wealth. An insider who can trade at all times can
optimize her wealth portfolio without limitations, and this is believed
to be valuable. Executives often hedge their portfolio by selling off
shares they are granted. 15 If these insiders cannot do this freely, this
will reduce the value of the shares granted, and therefore increase the
16
amount of shares necessary to achieve the same incentive effects.
Insiders likely value shares (or options) they are given at less than the
value of those shares to the firm, since the firm values the shares at
their cash value. The difference between the cash value of the stock or
options and their value to the executive is the opportunity cost for the
firm of paying in equity instead of cash. In a rational market, we

generously to provide desirable incentives can be a good compensation strategy for
shareholders.... Our concern is simply that executives have partly taken over the compensation
machine, leading to arrangements that fail to provide managers with desirable incentives.").
12. See Roulstone, supranote 1, at 526.
13. See J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN.
ECON. 191, 199-201, 206 (2000).
14. See id. at 208.
15. Eran Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the
Evolution of ManagerialOwnership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1370 (2000).
16. John Core & Wayne Guay, When Contracts Require Risk-Averse Executives to Hold
Equity: Implications for Option Valuation, for Relative Performance Evaluation, and for the
Corporate Governance Debate 7, (U. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 03-32,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=429301.
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should expect to see firms use options when the gains from the
reduction in agency costs from their use outweigh the costs of their
use.17

Permitting insiders to sell their shares in an attempt to
optimize their private wealth portfolio can reduce opportunity costs for
the firm, while preserving incentives for managers to act in the
interests of shareholders. Insiders will want to sell all or nearly all of
their shares, but will likely be permitted to do so only to the point
where the gains to the executive from increasing diversification (that
is, reducing the concentration of human and nonhuman capital in the
firm) equal the gains to the firm from incentivizing the executive. The
benefit that firms derive from allowing this trading is that, if the
executives can optimize their portfolio, the difference between the
value of the shares to the firm and the value to the executive will fall.
This will reduce the number of shares the firm has to issue to achieve
the desired level of incentive.' 8 Firms can also do this without large
information costs for the board, which presumably knows less about
the optimal portfolio mix for an executive than does the executive.
In this model, the board gives options it believes, based on the
limited information it has, are necessary to give the proper incentives.
The board then authorizes the executive to trade a certain number of
these options to turn them into cash until the point where the costs to
the individual and the firm are about equal. If insiders are allowed to
time their trades to turn shares into cash when they need it, and to
sell shares until the value they have for the next share given to them
comes closest to the value given by the firm, then opportunity costs
will be at their lowest. Importantly, in this model executives have
incentives to sell, even if they have no better information than those
with whom they are trading. We can call these trades for
diversification and consumption reasons "optimization trades."
Even so, there is a tradeoff in permitting insiders to reduce
firm opportunity costs. Increased trading opportunities may generate
other costs for the firm, thereby diminishing any reductions to
17. There is no empirical proof for this claim. It is a claim based on faith in markets for
labor and capital doing their work.
18. In addition, it may relieve the board from having to calculate with precision the optimal
amount of equity to be held at any time. Determining the best mix of pay and the amount of
equity an executive should hold at any time is a difficult task for the board. Executives have
better information than the board about the optimal structure of their portfolio and how they
value options. It may therefore be easier for the board to allocate an amount of options it
believes, based on its information at the time, is necessary to give the executive the proper
incentives, but then permit the executive to trade (within a given tolerance) shares to locally
maximize the executive's wealth.
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opportunity costs. One obvious additional cost is the potential that
executives will claim to be trading merely for diversification reasons,
but will actually have an information advantage vis-A-vis their trading
counterparty. We know insiders trade on the basis of informational
advantages, earning billions in profits at the expense of the outsiders
that they trade against. 19 This must be because the existing legal
regime is imperfect at detecting or deterring informed trading, and
because the benefits for firms from tolerating insider trading exceed
the costs. 20 We can call these "informed trades."
The existence of informed trading is costly both in terms of
legal risk and in terms of pure economics. Consider legal risk first.
Informed trades may impose legal costs on both the insider and the
firm. Insiders face civil and criminal penalties if they trade on the
basis of material, nonpublic information. 2 1 Firms also face their own
entity-level risks from insider trading. For instance, plaintiffs
commonly use trades by insiders to satisfy the scienter element of
class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud committed by the firm.
Although individual defendants do the trading and the speaking (on
behalf of the firm), and suffer reputational penalties as a result of the
suit, the firm bears most of the litigation costs, including paying for
the legal expenses and (likely) the liabilities of individual defendants.
Executives may not fully internalize these costs if, as many academics
and investors believe, these suits are random and largely without
22
merit.
Firms also incur nonlegal financial costs when insiders trade in
firm shares. For instance, the possibility of insiders trading on better
19.

See, e.g., H. NEJAT SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE FROM INSIDER TRADING 61

(1998) (finding stock prices rising significantly after insider purchases and falling significantly
following insider sales); Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, Information Distribution Within Firms:
Evidence from Stock Option Exercises, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (2002); H. Nejat Seyhun, The
Effectiveness of the Insider Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 149, 154 (1992) (showing insiders
earn nearly 10% in abnormal returns in the year following trades).
20. Firms could impose internal controls to reduce the prevalence of informed trading. For
instance, firms could ban trading until after the executive leaves the firm, could require trades to
be executed at random times or at the unchangeable discretion of a third party, or could require
all trades to be approved by the board or general counsel.
21. There are other rules too. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the socalled short-swing profit rule, requires statutory insiders to disgorge any profits earned on paired
buy and sell transactions within six months. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (2006). In addition, Rule 14e-3 prohibits anyone from trading on material, non-public
information about a pending tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2010).
22. For a summary of the literature and an analysis of legislation designed to increase the
ratio of meritorious to meritless lawsuits, with specific focus on the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, see generally Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The
Impact of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007).
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information than other market participants may increase the firm's
cost of capital. Specialists making markets in a firm's stock in which
insiders might be trading will increase the bid-ask spread to
compensate for the risk that they are trading at an informational
disadvantage, and this will reduce liquidity and raise the firm's cost of
23
capital.
The existence of some firms with insiders making informed
trades could also impose costs on other firms whose insiders are not
trading on information. If the legal system (be it government or
private plaintiffs) imperfectly identifies diversification trades as
informed trades, these trades may impose legal risks on the firm.
Insofar as it is possible to design a system, either intrafirm or across
firms, by which such trades can be identified, this cost can be reduced
or even eliminated. 24 The flip side is also true: insofar as firms cannot
credibly commit not to have insiders trade on nonpublic information,
then all firms, regardless of illegal activities by insiders, will pay
stockholders a risk premium for the possibility of such trades. If the
board does not bargain over the costs executives impose indirectly as a
result of their trading, firms may be systematically overpaying them.
In summary, permitting executives to make diversification
trades or informed trades has both costs and benefits for firms.
Diversification trades may be costly for the firm because they unwind
incentives given by the board, and therefore weaken attempts to align
executive and shareholder interests. In addition, these trades may be
misidentified as (illegal) informed trades, either ex ante (by traders
who demand a risk premium) or ex post (by lawyers and courts in
litigation). Informed trades expose not only individuals but also firms
to legal and financial risk. On the benefit side, trading may reduce the
overall cost of equity compensation from the perspective of the firm,
because trading can reduce the opportunity costs of each share
granted, and from that of the executive, because trading allows the
executive to optimize her wealth portfolio at any given time.
Given the large, ambiguous, and locally variant costs and
benefits of allowing insiders to trade, we should observe boards and
executives bargaining about whether managers can trade, and, if so,

23. See, e.g., Dale Morse & Neal Ushman, The Effect of Information Announcements on the
Market Microstructure,63 ACcT. REV. 247, 249 (1983) ('Tihe bid/ask spread should be positively
related to... the likelihood of private information existing ... ").
24. The SEC tried to do this with Rule 10b5-1, but, as discussed below, it failed. See infra
notes 91-94 and accompanying text. Some firms have also tried by making public
announcements about restrictions on trading to specific periods, or by requiring authorization by
the general counsel or board for any trades.
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25 As
when, how much, with whose permission, and related details.
discussed above, the tradeoffs are complicated, and the answers are
unlikely to be the same across firms or across time. We observe in fact
some firms banning insider trading altogether, some restricting it, and
some where insiders trade in great quantities.

III. BARGAINING ABOUT TRADING
There are three general choices firms can make about when
and how insiders can trade. The first choice is to prohibit insiders
from making any trades or to permit trades only with specific
authorization from either the board of directors or the general counsel.
The second choice is to give insiders discretion about when they can
trade, but restrict trades when insiders are likely to possess material,
nonpublic information, that is, where informational asymmetries
between insiders and outsiders are likely to be greatest. These
restrictions, called "blackout windows," are typically the thirty (or so)
days before a firm's quarterly earnings announcement. The third
choice is to impose few or no restrictions on trading. Almost all firms
today fall into the second group.
This heterogeneity in restrictions provides an opportunity to
examine the impact that firm choice about insider-trading freedom
has on the compensation bargain firms strike with their executives. If
firms are bargaining with executives and are aware of trading
behavior, then we should expect them, all else being equal, to pay
more when insiders are less free to trade. After all, the ability to trade
shares is worth something to executives, either because insiders can
best optimize their portfolio at any given time (optimization trades) or
because insiders can earn abnormal returns based on private
information (informed trades). Consistent with the optimization value,
we should also expect firms to tailor the size of their option and stock
grants (and target levels of stock ownership for executives) based on
trading freedom. This is because insiders who can locally optimize will
value each share given at closer to its inherent value for the firm, and
thus the firm will need to give the insider fewer shares to achieve the
same incentive results.
As mentioned above, nearly all firms use blackout windows to
limit executives to trading in brief periods following the release of
25. If we observe no bargaining, this would be relatively strong evidence of the managerial
power theory of executive compensation. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11. Evidence of
bargaining, on the contrary, does not refute the managerial power theory, but offers a way of
testing its strength.
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firms' earnings reports to investors. 26 This means that insiders can
trade for only narrow periods of time when they are least likely to
know things the market does not know. Existing theories predict that
this imposes large costs on firms, since these restrictions are costly for
executives. 27 However, there is scant empirical evidence supporting
these theories. Darren Roulstone shows how pay changes when
trading is restricted, but he cannot attribute this to optimization
trades as opposed to informed trades. 28 There may be good reason to
doubt that the value of optimization is large. After all, if the typical
blackout window is about thirty days before an earnings
announcement, managers can trade freely in eight months out of the
year and are never more than two weeks from a time in which a trade
could be or could have been made. The data presented below provide
an opportunity to unpack the value of optimization and informed
trading.
In recognition of the apparent value of optimization trading
and in an attempt to reduce the costs of it on firms, the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b5-1, which allows insiders to reduce firm
litigation risk by precommitting to future trades. In effect, these plans
are a safe way for firms and insiders to unwind the limitations
imposed by blackout windows. The restrictions in blackout windows
and the unwinding of them in Rule 10b5-1 plans allow us to test
whether boards adjust executive compensation in response to when
these changes to trading are implemented. Let us consider each of
them in turn.
A. BargainingAbout Blackout Windows
In a hypothetical bargain between an executive and the board
of directors, the executive has a reservation wage below which she will
not work, and the board must (at least) meet this wage when setting
her pay. Boards meet the reservation wage with some combination of
cash compensation and equity compensation. 29 Inherent in the
calculation on both sides is some expectation about what the executive
will do with the shares granted by the firm. If insiders expect to earn a

26. See Henderson et al., supranote 4, at 13; Roulstone, supranote 1, at 527.
27. For a summary of the theories on why insiders value the ability to trade at any time
independent of their information, see Roulstone, supranote 1, at 529-30.
28. See id.
29. The typical compensation contact also includes, among other things, perquisites,
deferred compensation, health and retirement benefits, and contributions to long-term incentive
plans.
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certain amount from trading the shares they are given, either in terms
of optimization or informed trades, these profits should be a
component of the reservation wage calculation. In short, changes in
the opportunities to trade should increase the executive's demand for
other forms of compensation.
Research by Roulstone finds just this: when executives are
restricted in their ability to trade, they are given more cash and other
forms of compensation. 30 The data show that the parties to the
executive's compensation contract price the details about expected
executive trading. 31 Roulstone exploits the fact that not all firms
during his study period imposed blackout windows to test whether
firms compensate insiders for the lost trading opportunities. He finds
that "firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total
compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after
controlling for economic determinants of pay." 32 Specifically, firms
restricting insiders' ability to trade pay about 13% more in total
33
compensation than firms permitting insiders to trade freely.
Roulstone's findings suggest that boards and executives
bargain about trading behavior, but do not show how complete this
bargaining is or whether the bargaining is about lost profits expected
from optimized trades, informed trades, or both. These are important
and yet unanswered questions. The offset issue implicates theories
about executive compensation and managerial power over the paysetting process. If bargaining is more or less complete, then this
suggests a rather arm's-length relationship between the average board
and the average executive. Alternatively, the degree of bargaining
may vary with board power vis-a-vis managers, thus allowing us to
test measures of governance, such as board composition.
The type-of-trades issue is important for two reasons. First,
informed trades are generally illegal, and determining whether boards
are compensating insiders for their ability to earn abnormal returns
will tell us something about corporate governance and insider-trading
law. Second, as noted above, the SEC believed that with Rule 10b5-1 it

30. See Roulstone, supra note 1, at 548-49.
31. Id. at 526.
32. Id. at 525.
33. Id. at 526. Roulstone also finds that firms restricting trading "use more incentive-based
compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not
restrict insider trading." Id. at 525. This is consistent with the theory above about the cost
arising from the inability of insiders to optimize their portfolio. Insiders who cannot trade as
liberally should receive more shares than those who can rebalance their portfolio, all else being
equal. This is what Roulstone finds. Id.
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was encouraging optimization trades but not informed trades, and
unpacking the two trading strategies using the Rule as an exogenous
change to firm behavior allows us to determine whether boards share
this belief. Rule 10b5-1 as practiced also allows us to estimate the
completeness of bargaining and unpack the trading profits into
constituent components.
Fortunately, a recent SEC rule allows us to compare
executives' propensity to trade on inside information, and thus make
some progress in determining whether boards bargain over informedtrading profits as well as optimization profits, and, if so, their success
at doing so.
B. BargainingAbout IOb5-1 Plans
The other contractual mechanism for adjusting insider-trading
propensity is firm-level authorization of so-called "Rule 10b5-1 trading
plans." In 2000, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 to give firms a way
to permit executives to more readily diversify their firm-specific
holdings. 34 The Rule gives executives an affirmative defense if they
commit to future trades so long as they do not possess material,
nonpublic information when they commit to trade, and regardless of
whether they have such information when they execute the trades.
Regulators expected insiders to use 10b5-1 plans to execute
uninformed diversification trades, but not informed trades. 35 They
34. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, stated recently
that "the idea [of Rule 10b5-1] was to give executives opportunities to diversify or become more
liquid through the use of plans with prearranged trades without facing the prospect of an insider
trading investigation." Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Opening
Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm.
35. Specifically, the Rule provides an insider an affirmative defense if:
(A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had:
(1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,
(2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing
person's account, or
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading securities;
(B) The contract, instruction, or plan described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this
Section:
(1) Specified the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at
which and the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold;
(2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or computer program, for
determining the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at
which and the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or
(3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how,
when, or whether to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any
other person who, pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise
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expected to increase opportunities for optimization trading but to
leave unchanged, and perhaps decrease the value of, informed trading.
Regardless of whether this prediction is borne out, the Rule should
increase the value of insiders' shares. The two reasons for this are that
the Rule unwinds blackout windows and lowers the cost of informed
trading.
1. Unwinding Blackout Windows
Rule 10b5-1 plans reduce trade-related litigation risk for firms
by providing an affirmative defense in cases in which the executive
possesses nonpublic information on the date of the trade but does not
"use" it because the trade was planned at a time when the insider did
not have the information. This reduction in risk means that the firm
need not worry as much about trades made during blackout windows,
since the goal of the blackout windows was simply to reduce expected
litigation costs from trades executed during that time. 36 As long as
trades made within blackout windows were planned outside of the
restricted period, the firm should be indifferent in terms of legal risk.
This means that 10b5-1 plans make blackout windows unnecessary
and allow executives to freely trade on all available trading days.
Accordingly, shares held by insiders in firms that allow 10b5-1
plans should be more valuable, all else being equal, than the same
shares held by insiders in firms that do not allow such plans-that is,
where trading is still restricted by blackout windows. The freedom to
sell at any time is valuable to executives, even if they do not have
private information about the value of the shares at that time, since
the ability to trade permits the executive to maintain a more optimal
wealth portfolio at any given moment. For instance, an executive
might need to increase the percentage of cash in her portfolio in order
to pay for consumption or might want to decrease the percentage of
such influence must not have been aware of the material nonpublic information
when doing so; and
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or
plan. A purchase or sale is not "pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan" if, among
other things, the person who entered into the contract, instruction, or plan altered or
deviated from the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities (whether
by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or entered into or
altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those
securities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(i) (2010).
36. Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 2. For example, a firm may authorize an executive to
enter into a 10b5-1 trading plan on January 1 that commits the insider to trade on March 31,
even though the firm may otherwise ban trades in the period right before the firm announces its
first-quarter earnings on April 1.
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firm stock in her portfolio to reduce her overall risk. 37 These are
optimization trades. As noted above, however, there is some question
about how valuable the ability to trade at any time is, and the data
below offer a test of this value.
We should expect the use of Rule 10b5-1 to change executive
compensation bargains. Plans allow insiders to unwind blackout
windows, and Roulstone's finding (that firms pay more when they
impose blackout windows) implies that this is valuable to insiders.
Accordingly, total insider pay should fall after a firm authorizes the
use of 10b5-1 trading plans, since insiders will now value their shares
more than they did when their trading was more limited. 38 In
addition, pay should be lower in a firm using 10b5-1 plans than in a
comparable firm not using the plans, all else being equal. 39 This would
basically be a retest of Roulstone's finding that the imposition of
blackout windows is correlated with an increase in other pay. If firms
unwind blackout windows by permitting the use of an SEC rule, does
the increase in pay Roulstone found go away?
If pay is not different either over the pre-Rule/post-Rule period,
or across 10b5-1/non-10b5- firms, then we can conclude that either
the Rule is not effective at liberalizing trading opportunities, or,
perhaps, contra-Roulstone, that managers are able to dominate the
pay-setting process so that gains in one form of compensation are not
offset by reductions in other forms of compensation. There is literature
suggesting that wages are often sticky, rising when markets change in
a positive direction, from the perspective of the employee, but not
37. The ability to borrow against shares may be limited because the pledgee is likely to
value the shares at a large discount. This is because the pledgee steps into the shoes of the
pledgor (who may be restricted in the type or amount of sales that can be made) and because
default on the loan may be highly correlated with a drop in the value of the stock. In addition, if
the pledgee needs to force the sale of large numbers of shares in a fire sale, this may cause the
value of the collateral to drop. Finally, pledgees are likely to discount shares or options because
of the concern about information asymmetries between the pledgor, who is an insider, and the
pledgee. It is likely for these reasons that many firms ban insiders from using shares as
collateral. For a recent media account of these issues, see Reed Abelson, Insiders' Share Sales on
Margin on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008
/10/20lbusinessl20pay.html.
38. We should expect executives in firms that do not authorize 10b5-1 plans to be paid
more than executives in firms that do, since the in-plan insiders can be expected to earn greater
profits from trading their shares. In the nomenclature above, T is greater for executives that are
authorized to use Rule 10b5-1 than for executives who cannot use rule. Accordingly, holding an
executive's reservation wage constant, executives with greater T should see a commensurate
reduction in the value of S and/or B.
39. For example, the econometric analysis reported below tries to account for other
determinants of pay by controlling for industry, firm size, economic performance, and other
variables.
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falling in similar amounts when markets change in a negative
direction. 40 The potential one-way ratchet of pay, coupled with
potential manager dominance of the pay-setting process, might
explain persistent wages in the face of increased trading flexibility for
insiders.
2. Lowering the Cost of Informed Trading
Rule 10b5-1 not only allows executives to increase the times
when they can trade, but it may also offer them a way to earn profits
from informed trades. If the Rule is imperfect, either because of a
loophole or because of an error in application by courts or plaintiffs'
lawyers, it may shield informed trades from scrutiny. For instance, it
may be more difficult to prove the elements of an insider-trading case
when a plan is used, say, because the inference of trading based on
information is more difficult if the timing of the trading decision is
further removed from the time of trading. If legal risk is (accidentally)
reduced for informed trades, the Rule can be valuable to executives
who will be able to sell when in possession of private information that
the future value of the shares will be lower.
Alan Jagolinzer shows that the Rule also allows executives to
41
earn considerable abnormal returns from informed trades.
Jagolinzer finds that insiders using 10b5-1 plans earn significant
42
abnormal returns compared with insiders not using the plans. As
above, this offers an opportunity to retest Roulstone's finding that
boards compensate insiders for reductions in trading freedom. The
additional benefit from the Jagolinzer data is that it is about informed
trades, rather than optimization trades. This means that we may be
able to unpack the Roulstone finding of about 13% for the value of
trading profits into its elements, since we now have some traction on
the existence of informed trades.
However, we need a mechanism to sort between firms where
informed trades are more likely, because the Roulstone finding says
nothing about informed trades. 43 It could be that the imposition of
blackout windows is costly for executives primarily because of the
40. See TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A RECESSION 150-52, 160-61,
170-73 (1999) (discussing reasons for and timing of increases and decreases in wages).
41. See Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI.
224, 226-27 (2009) (discussing the features and restrictions of Rule 10b-5 that permit abnormal
market returns).
42. Id.
43. Roulstone, supra note 1, at 536-38, 544-46, 548-49 (describing the results of the
author's insider trading studies).
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reduction in optimization trades, the reduction in informed trades, or
some combination of both-the data do not say. Separating out firms
where informed trades are more likely under Rule 10b5-1 plans,
however, should allow us to evaluate the impact that the adoption of
the Rule at the firm level has on pay. In short, firms where informed
trading is much less likely under Rule 10b5-1 plans would likely pay
executives solely for the freedom to engage in optimization trades,
whereas firms where informed trading is much more likely under
these plans would likely pay executives for the opportunity to engage
in both optimization trades and informed trades.
3. Separating Informed and Optimization Trades
New research provides precisely this separating equilibrium
that allows us to sort firms into optimization-trading-only firms and
optimization-and-informed-trading firms. Todd Henderson, Alan
Jagolinzer, and Karl Muller ("HJM") find that abnormal returns of
insiders using Rule 10b5-1 trading plans are increasing in the
specificity of disclosure of the plans. 44 On average, insiders at firms
that disclose the use of 10b5-1 plans earn significant abnormal
returns, while insiders at firms that do not disclose the use of 10b5-1
plans exhibit trading patterns consistent only with optimization
45
trades.
Firms permitting the use of Rule 10b5-1 plans but not
disclosing their use (the "nondisclosure group") seem to use the Rule
in the way the SEC intended, while executives at firms making some
disclosure of the use of 10b5-1 plans (the "disclosure group") seem to
use the Rule to do some combination of optimization trades and
informed trades. 46 Firms that make disclosures about trading plans do
so because the specificity of public disclosure creates a stronger
litigation prophylactic, which is increasingly necessary as the
47
probability of informed trading increases.

44. Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 19, 43-44.
45. See Jagolinzer, supra note 41, at 232-33.
46. See Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 28.
47. As HJM surmise, this disclosure choice is based on a tradeoff between the benefits and
costs of disclosure. Id. at 1. Disclosure (and the more the better) increases the value of the
litigation deterrence, since only publicly disclosed plans can deter suits from being filed, and only
publicly disclosed plans can be admitted (as public documents) at the motion to dismiss stage
before discovery costs increase. On the other hand, detailed disclosure increases the commitment
value to trade in a particular way, since observers can determine ex post whether insiders have
followed through on their plan. In addition, it may allow market participants to front run the
insider's planned trades and take any profits for themselves. From this model, we can determine
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If we compare the change in pay of firms within each group
(nondisclosure versus disclosure) over the period before and after
adoption of a trading plan, a theory of (at least somewhat) informed
board bargaining would predict that the pay of firms in the disclosure
group would fall by more than the pay of firms in the nondisclosure
group. This is because the executives in firms disclosing the use of
10b5-1 plans should earn larger profits from trading. To see this
effect, consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B. At ti, Firm A and
Firm B both restrict insider trading using blackout windows. Firm A
pays its CEO a total wage of WA 1 and Firm B pays its CEO a wage
WB1. At t 2 , Firm A and Firm B both authorize their CEOs to use 10b51 plans. Accordingly, at t3 we expect the total reported compensation
of the CEOs to change to reflect the increased trading profits possible
with use of the plans. Now imagine that Firm A discloses the existence
of its CEO's plan, while Firm B does not. HJM show that from this
disclosure choice, we can conclude that the CEO of Firm A is expected
48
to earn greater profits from trading shares than the CEO of Firm B.
Accordingly, the change in reported compensation for the CEO of Firm
A (WA3-WAl) should be different than the change in compensation for
the CEO of Firm B (WB3-WBi), controlling for the other determinants
of compensation, such as the economic performances of Firm A and
Firm B. Specifically, the reported pay of the CEO of Firm A should
rise less (or fall more) than the CEO of Firm B over the period tl to t3,
since the CEO of Firm A can earn more in expectation from sales of
stock during that time period.
4. The Completeness of Bargaining
Rule 10b5-1 thus presents a nice opportunity to revisit the
optimal contracting versus managerial power debate. If we can
estimate the abnormal returns executives in the disclosure partition
earn from informed trading, we can then compare this with the offset
these insiders receive to their total pay to determine whether the
bargaining fully accounts for the expected profits, whether it only
partially does so, or whether managers are able to earn additional
profits without significant changes to their wages.

that insiders with a high risk of suit and no plans to change their planned trades-those who are
certain of a large negative price drop, for instance-are likely to make detailed disclosures, while
those with a lower, but nonzero, risk of suit and valuing the option of being able to change their
plans-those with uncertainty about future price drops-are likely to make less specific
disclosures. See id. at 9.
48. Id. at 2.
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If the offset is incomplete, it may be because of manager
dominance in the pay-setting process, as proponents of the managerial
power hypothesis claim, or because of informational deficiencies of the
board, or because of the stickiness of wages, or for some other reason
or combination of these reasons. The theory provides numerous
equally plausible alternatives. On the other hand, if the offset is more
or less complete, it would suggest that the board is fairly well
informed about the impact of the Rule and the expected trades of
insiders, as well as actual bargaining about how to meet an executive's
reservation wage.
IV. DATA
In order to unpack the components of insider-trading profits to
test whether boards take the profits from informed trades into
consideration when setting pay, we exploit prior research on the use of
10b5-1 trading plans. We start with the dataset of HJM for firms
using 10b5-1 trading plans from 2000 to 2006. This dataset includes
2,934 firms using plans over this time period. Estimation samples are
constrained by the availability of price and returns data from CRSP,
insider transaction data from Thomson Financial, institutional
ownership data from CDA/Spectrum, governance data from Equilar,
and earnings performance data from Compustat. In addition, firms
were excluded when there were not five years of financial data and if
there were not data for both the year before and the year after a 10b51 plan was used for the first time. This yields a total of 638 firm
observations, including firms making explicit disclosures of 10b5-1
usage and firms for which their use is implied, as per the methodology
of HJM. 49 This difference is crucial for the analysis, because as HJM
show, insiders making explicit disclosures earn significantly greater
abnormal returns than insiders not making disclosures of 10b5-1
usage. This difference provides the mechanism for testing bargaining
about potential informed-trading profits.
Disclosure and nondisclosure firms are statistically similar in
size and performance (Table 1). The median disclosure firm has
slightly greater growth prospects and greater market value, but earns
slightly less in operating income and is somewhat smaller in asset
size. The mean values for these two groups of firms are not
statistically different along these dimensions.

49. See id. at 15.
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Table 1: Comparing
Nondisclosure Firms

Economics Performance

of Disclosure

and

Economic performance
Disclosure

Nondisclosure

T-test (p value)

Average

8,286

8,489

0.75

Median

1,921

1,489

Average

805

816

Median

198

205

1.33
1.29

1.27

Average

0.38

0.59

Median

0.34

0.47

Average

318

288

Median

75

65

Average

5,052

5,495

Median

1,112

1,546

4,973

5,431

=

Market value
($, millions)

Operating income
0.22

EPS
Average
Median

0.02"*

1.23

Booklmarket
0.67

Net income
0.01-

Revenues
0.38

Assets
Average
Median

0.27

993
1,508
= Two-tailed, paired t-test
* Statistically significant at the 10% level
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
Statistically significant at the 1% level

Table 2 shows that CEO compensation is also comparable
across disclosure and nondisclosure firms. There is no statistically
significant difference in the average total compensation of disclosure
and nondisclosure firms or in the mix of pay across the two groups.
Based on the data in these two tables, we can be confident that the
disclosure and nondisclosure group are relatively similar in terms of
firm size, industry, profitability, managerial talent, and so forth. This
allows us to examine changes in compensation across various time
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periods and be confident that the changes are not driven by the fact
that the firms in question are radically different.
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Table 2: Comparing Compensation of Disclosure and Nondisclosure
Firms
Compensation
Disclosure

Nondisclosure

T-test (p value)f

Average

6,223

5,028

0.74

Median

3,554

3,086

Total compensation

($, 000)

Salary
Average

714

Median

672

Bonus
Average

0.01-*

686
378

728

3,081
1,159

2,378

Average
Median
Insider ownership
(percent)

0.68
0.77

0.66
0.73

0.73

Average

0.026
0.003

0.028
0.003

0.08*

Median
Shares outstanding

Median
Options granted
Average
Median
Pay mix
(performance/total)

0.01**

392
0.11

904

0.25

Average
Median
-

Two-tailed, paired t-test
significant at the 10% level
Statistically significant at the 5% level

* Statistically

Statistically significant at the 1% level

Another cut of the data is to look at the pay of firms using
10b5-1 plans and firms not using them. This allows us to test whether
the liberalization of trading policies with the Rule creates significant
changes in executive pay. In order to compare the pay at firms using
the Rule and those not using the Rule, a matched set of nonplan firms
was created. Each of the firms using 10b5-1 plans was matched with a
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firm in the same industry (four-digit SIC code) and of similar size,
based on assets and revenues. 50 This matched set of nonplan firms
was then limited to the years of inquiry for the plan firms. For
example, Firm A, which had an insider first trade using a 10b5-1 plan
in 2002, is matched with Firm B, which never had an insider trade
under a plan, then the matched dataset is limited to the years 2001
through 2003 for Firm B.
The matched set of firms is comparable to the in-plan firms.
The average total compensation is $5.2 million, the average value of
options given is $2.9 million, and the average salaries, bonuses, and
51
other metrics are all similar to those of the in-plan firms.
Economically, the firms are also similar. The average market value
($7.9 billion), revenues ($5.5 billion), operating income ($820 million),
and net income ($190 million) are all comparable to the in-plan firms.
These mean comparisons of plan and nonplan firms are not
statistically significant, suggesting that we can be confident the
52
groups are similar along these dimensions.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

A. Difference-in-Difference
We compare the pay of executives disclosing their use of Rule
10b5-1 trading plans with the pay of executives not disclosing their
use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans.5 3 Specifically, we are interested in
how executive pay changes when the firm authorizes Rule 10b5-1
trading. We can do this by comparing the change in pay from the year
before the first use of a plan with the pay in the year after the first use
of a plan (that is, Payt-1 - Payt i, where t is the year in which the
executive first used Rule 10b5-1 to make trades).
We expect the change in pay for disclosure firms to be different
than the change in pay for nondisclosure firms, since, as HJM show,
executives at firms making disclosures about 10b5-1 plans can be
expected to earn greater profits from trading than executives at firms
not making disclosures. 54 Specifically, HJM group firms into three
specificity:
categories, with increasing levels of disclosure
50. "Similar" here means within 20% of the particular firm at issue.
51. A comparison of median values, not reported here, shows the same result.
52. These results are in unreported t-tests.
53. The data include only CEOs who are in the same position for the two periods examined
in the study.
54. Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 3 n.7, 28.
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nondisclosure (or implied disclosure), limited disclosure, and specific
disclosure. 55 They find the nondisclosure group earns no abnormal
returns in the six months following insider trades under 10b5-1
plans. 56 That is, the stock price change of the more than 1,000 firms
making no disclosure of 10b5-1 plans is as likely to be positive as it is
to be negative-it is akin to a coin flip. In contrast, the change in stock
price for firms making limited disclosure is significantly negative
following insider 10b5-1 sales,5 7 allowing insiders to earn abnormal
returns of about 12% per year on average. The smaller group of
specific disclosure firms experiences even greater stock price drops
following insider sales. 58 The takeaway is that disclosure choice is a
good predictor of expected abnormal returns for insiders. This is
because insiders at firms that disclose the use of plans have greater
opportunities to trade based on inside information. Disclosure choice
flows from the greater potential for insider-trading returns, and
therefore should be associated with larger changes in pay as trading
opportunities expand and contract, either by law or by contract.
As shown in Table 3, the average and median change in total
pay is less for disclosure firms (a combination of the limited and
specific groups from HJM) than for nondisclosure firms. 59 Total pay
rises 27% over the period for nondisclosure firms, while only 18% for
disclosure firms. The difference in compensation is explainable
primarily by changes in the value of options granted. While the cash
compensation is comparable across the disclosure partition, executives
at the median nondisclosure firm saw the value of the stock options
granted increase by 18% from the pre-plan to the post-plan year, while
executives at the median disclosure firm saw the value of the stock
options granted decrease by 15%. This larger increase in total pay for
nondisclosure firms is initially consistent with the prediction that
firms take expected profits from insider trading, including informed
trades, into consideration when setting pay. If the disclosure firm
executives are expected to earn greater trading profits than the
nondisclosure firm executives, then we would expect them to need less
explicit pay to meet their reservation wage.

55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 19, 43.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 22.
59. For the present study, the limited and specific disclosure groups are combined into a
single disclosure group, and these firms are compared with firms in the nondisclosure group of

HJM.
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Table 3: Change in Compensation Across Disclosure Partitions
(Pre-Plan Year to Post-Plan Year)
Compensation

Disclosure

Nondisclosure

Average

-2%

6%

Median
Mix
(PerfJTotal)

18%

27%

Average

-1%

1%

Median

1%

4%

Average

9%

9%

Median

8%

12%

Disclosure
relative to
nondisclosure

T-test (p value)

Total pay
0.03*

0.48

Salary
0.53

Options value
-7%
-29%
-15%
18%
=Two-tailed, paired t-test
* Statistically significant at the 10% level

Average
Median

0.41

significant at the 5% level
Statistically significant at the 1% level

** Statistically

This difference could be explained, however, by factors
unrelated to the fact that during the intervening year the firm
authorized executives to use Rule 10b5-1 trading plans and the CEO
of the company first used a trading plan to make a trade. For instance,
although disclosure and nondisclosure firms are similar in market
value, asset size, and economic performance, disclosure firms appear
to have greater growth prospects as shown by comparing book-tomarket values across the disclosure and nondisclosure firms. In
addition, it is possible that small variations in economic performance
could explain differences in pay across the disclosure partition. For
instance, Table 1 shows that nondisclosure firms earn a bit more in
operating income, 60 and this might explain differences in pay.
A first way of testing the potential confounding effects of
economic performance is to examine the average and median changes
60. Nondisclosure firms earned about $816 million in operating income on average,
compared with $805 million for disclosure firms. The results are, however, not statistically
significant.
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in performance across the disclosure partition. If changes in firm
economic performance are the reason why disclosure firms saw
smaller pay increases relative to nondisclosure firms, then we should
expect to see the change in economic performance for disclosure firms
to be worse than for nondisclosure firms.
The opposite is true. As shown in Table 4, the average and
median disclosure firm performs as well as or better than the average
and median nondisclosure firm across all economic performance
metrics. In fact, disclosure firms experienced larger increases in
market value, operating income, earnings per share ("EPS"), and net
income than nondisclosure firms. The most significant of these is the
change in market value, which is the best predictor of changes in total
executive pay,61 EPS, and net income, all of which are statistically
significant.
This difference-in-difference data is inconsistent with a
performance-only explanation for the change in pay from pre- to
post-plan years across the disclosure partition. These data are
consistent with the hypothesis described above: executives at
disclosure firms are expected to earn greater trading profits in the
year(s) following the deployment of a Rule 10b5-1 plan, and therefore
should see reductions in their explicit compensation, conditional on
economic performance.

61. Unreported univariate regressions show that the change in market value is statistically
significant and is consistently the best predictor of changes in executive pay across all of the
several thousand firms in the HJM database.
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Across

Disclosure

Economic performance

Disclosure

Nondisclosure

Disclosure
relative to
nondisclosure

T-test
(p value)

Market value
Average

14%

1%

Median
Operating
income

47%

21%

Average

25%

14%

Median

49%

11%

Average

66%

7%

Median

47%

4%

0.05**

0.6

EPS
0.03*

Book/market
Average

0.96

Median
Net income
Average

252%

46%

Median

91%

29%

21%

12%

0.08*

Revenues
Average
Median

0.67

24%
23%
Two-tailed, paired t-test
* Statistically significant at the 10% level
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
Statistically significant at the 1% level

-

We can further test the difference-in-difference results by
estimating a linear regression for determinates of the change in pay
from the pre-plan year to the post-plan year for each firm:
ATotal(t+l) - (t-1) = (to + aiDisclosure + a2AMarketValue(t+i) - (t-1) +
a3AAssets(t+l) - (t-1) + a4ANetIncome(t+I) - (t-1) + a 5ABM(t+l) - (t-i) +
a7AInsiderOwn(t-4) + E
where "disclosure" is dummy variable, set to 1 if the firm made
an explicit disclosure of 10b5-1 use (disclosure group) and 0 if the
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firm's use of 10b5-1 was implied (nondisclosure group), 62 and where
the other variables are financial and accounting determinants of
pay.63 Industry and year fixed effects are included in the regression.
The results of the ordinary-least-squares linear regression
support the proposition that disclosure is negatively correlated with
change in pay (Table 5). The regressions show that pay for firms is
positively correlated with changes in market value and asset value
(98% confidence interval), and negatively correlated with changes in
book-to-market value (95% confidence interval). Firms that grow and
are worth more can be expected to compensate executives accordingly,
and firms with greater growth prospects can as well.
Disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans is also a statistically
significant determinate of the change in pay (95% confidence interval).
This is consistent with the implicit-compensation hypothesis. The
coefficient on the disclosure dummy variable is negative, meaning the
use and disclosure of a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan is associated with
negative changes in the amount of pay for CEOs. Since disclosure
choice is associated with greater expected insider-trading profits
(especially from informed trades), the data suggest that changes in
pay are negatively correlated with expected insider-trading profits.
Firms where insiders are likely to earn significant abnormal returns
from informed trading (in addition to those from optimization trades)
see smaller increases in pay than firms where insiders are likely to
engage only in optimization trades. This is consistent with the
findings from the difference-in-difference analysis reported above, and
suggests that boards are bargaining with executives about their
ability to earn greater trading profits through less risky informed
trading as a result of the litigation prophylactic from disclosure of
10b5-1 plans.

62. The methodology and dataset of disclosure firms is taken from Henderson et al., supra
note 4, at 11-15.
63. The analysis follows the methodology from the original work on this subject by Darren
Roulstone. See Roulstone, supra note 1, 531-43. In this equation, AMarketValue(t+,) - (t-,) is the
change in market value of the firm from the pre- to post-10b5-1 year; AAssets(t+l) - (t_1)is the
change in assets of the firm from the pre- to the post-plan period; ANetIncomeo+i) - (i-I) is the
change in net income of the firm from the pre- to the post-plan period; 5ABM(t+,) - (t-1) is the
change in the ratio of assets to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of
liabilities from the pre- to the post-plan years; and 7AInsiderOwn(t+.) (t-1) is the change in the
percentage of stock owned by the insider from the pre- to the post-plan years.
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Table 5: Results of OLS Regression
Linear Regression
Regression
Statistics
R

0.37

R Square

0.14

Adjusted R
Square
Standard

0.12

Error

6293.09

Total Number
of Cases

638
Co-efficients

Standard

Error

LCL

Intercept
1347.6
1194.9
-1439.4
Market
value
0.2
0.0
0.1
Disclosure
-1219.8
601.0
-2621.6
Assets
0.5
0.1
0.2
Net income
0.0
0.1
-0.2
Book to
market
-1166.5
597.0
-2558.9
Percent
insider
ownership
-11943.9
8702.8
-32241.7
T(2%)
2.3
LCL - Lower value of a reliable interval (LCL)
UCL - Upper value of a reliableinterval (UCL)

UCL

t Stat

p-level

4134.7

1.13

0.26

0.2
182.0
0.7
0.1

6.70
-2.03
4.61
-0.51

0.00
0.04
0.00
0.62

225.9

-1.95

0.05

8353.8

-1.37

0.17

We can get a rough idea of the size of the tradeoff between
explicit and implicit compensation by looking at the magnitude of the
coefficient on the disclosure dummy variable, since this reflects the
best estimate of that variable's influence on CEO pay. The coefficient
for disclosure (-1,220) suggests that firms making disclosure of Rule
10b5-1 plans (and thus aware that insiders have the potential to earn
significant abnormal returns) pay CEOs more than a million dollars
less in the year following disclosure than in the year before
disclosure. 64 For the average (disclosure) firm in the sample, this
64. Compensation data in the sample are reported in thousands of dollars, and the variable
for this coefficient is a dummy (either 0 or 1). So a coefficient of 1,220 translates to about $1.2
million.
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amounts to about a 20% reduction in total compensation in the year
following disclosure of a 10b5-1 plan relative to the year prior to its
first use.
We will see below that this offset in compensation is roughly
comparable with other research showing the actual average trading

profits that CEOs of disclosure firms earn.65 It seems that firms take

expected trading profits, which are obviously influenced by the law
and the contracts firms write in the shadow of the law, into account
when setting CEO pay.
B. Plan Versus Nonplan Firms
The results of a comparison between executive pay at firms
using 10b5-1 plans and those at firms not using these plans support,
albeit not as powerfully, the conclusion that boards are bargaining
about expected trading profits. The median change in pay for matched,
nonplan firms over the relevant time periods was 19% (-2% average)
compared with 23% (3% average) for plan firms. At first glance, this
seems inconsistent with Roulstone's result and the evidence presented
above from comparing the pay across the disclosure partition-we
expect insiders with increased trading opportunities (plan insiders) to
be compensated less on a relative basis than insiders who remain
restricted by blackout windows (nonplan insiders). But, as above, the
baseline of pay from which changes based on the liberalness of the
trading regime will be made is determined by economic factors, such
as changes in market value.
If we compare the economic performance of plan and nonplan
firms, we find that plan firms significantly outperform nonplan firms.
The median change in market value over the pre- to post-plan period
for plan firms is 35% (6% average), compared with 16% (-8% average)
for nonplan firms. As noted above, change in market value is the best
predictor of the change in pay delivered in a given year, and firms
using 10b5-1 plans saw their market value increase more than twice
as much as nonplan firms. And, yet, the change in pay for firms using
plans and those not using plans was comparable. This suggests, albeit
somewhat more weakly than Roulstone's finding and the one above,
that boards take plan profits into consideration when setting pay. If
they did not, we would expect to see the firms using plans to increase
pay more than they did.
65. See supra Part IV (comparing disclosure and non-disclosure firms and compensation
using 10b5-1 trading plans data).
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A simple linear regression of the determinants of the change in
pay, including the change in market value, change in assets, change in
income, change in revenues, and whether the firm authorized the use
of 10b5-1 plans, yields inconclusive results. The 10b5-1 plan variable
(a dummy variable set to 1 for firms using plans and 0 for firms where
insiders do not use plans) is not statistically significant, whereas
market value and other economic determinants are at various
confidence levels. This suggests that the effect of plan choice is weak,
the other determinants are much stronger, or that the matched set of
firms is misspecified or not the best comparable set of firms.
C. Nonplan Versus Nondisclosure Firms
Unreported data comparing pay changes between nonplan
firms and nondisclosure firms yield another potentially interesting
inference. It is across this partition that we should observe any value
from optimization trades. After all, the SEC's stated purpose in
adopting the Rule was to allow optimization trades, and HJM show
that the nondisclosure group is the one in which insiders are not
earning informed-trading profits.6 6 So if we compare the change in pay
for nonplan insiders and insiders using plans but not disclosing them
(and therefore earning only optimization profits), we should be able to
observe whether these plans are worth much to insiders.
The difference-in-difference comparison shows that insiders
with greater opportunities for optimization trades see greater changes
in pay than insiders with fewer opportunities, but that economic
performance is also better for these firms.6 7 This crude finding is
confirmed by a linear regression of the change in pay versus economic
determinants of pay and whether the insider/firm is trading in a plan
or using a plan but not disclosing it. The dummy variable for in-plan,
nondisclosure insiders is not a statistically significant determinant of
pay. As in the regressions reported above, change in market value is.
This suggests that the increased value of optimization trades
permitted by the Rule is slight. Otherwise, we should observe firms
reducing the pay of insiders with these opportunities relative to a
matched set of firms where insiders do not have these opportunities.
This conclusion seriously undermines the alleged basis for the SEC
66. See supra Part V.
67. The median CEO of a plan/nondisclosure firm had an increase of about $500,000 in total
pay over the period, while the median CEO of a nonplan firm had an increase of about $350,000.
The performance of the median plan/nondisclosure firm was an increase of market value of about
$300 million, while the median nonplan firm increased by about $200 million.
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Rule, but it also raises questions about why insiders nevertheless
deploy plans that are not disclosed. Although this inquiry is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is possible that there are values, such as
risk aversion at either the firm or individual level, or signaling value
to investors, that are not perfectly captured in the reported
compensation levels.
D. Robustness Check
In order to test the robustness of the main finding-firms
where expected trading profits are greater see significantly different
and negative changes in pay relative to firms where expected trading
profits are less-the pay of these two groups of firms are compared in
periods before the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. If the
adoption and disclosure of a Rule 10b5-1 plan is a significant event
and causes an observable difference in the change in pay between the
two groups, the change in pay in periods before the adoption of such
trading plans should not be statistically different between the two
groups. Instead, the change in pay should be driven by economic
factors, such as change in market value or firm income.
To conduct this test, we compare the disclosure and
nondisclosure groups' pay and performance data in the three-year
period immediately prior to the first adoption of a Rule 10b5-1 plan.
So if Firm X first had an executive use a 10b5-1 plan for the first time
in 2001, the relevant years for the analysis above were 2000 (the year
before) and 2002 (the year after). For this robustness check, we
compare pay in 1997 and 1999, which gives us a similar time period
not influenced by the existence of a 10b5-1 trading plan. This time
period selection methodology is used for the firms in both the
disclosure and nondisclosure groups.
From the original dataset of 638 firms, we eliminated firms
that did not have compensation or performance data during the threeyear period before the first use of a Rule 10b5-1 plan. The dataset for
the robustness check therefore consists of 545 firms-345 firms in the
nondisclosure group and 205 firms in the disclosure group.
The difference-in-difference results show compensation to be
correlated with economic performance in ways consistent with the
results presented above. The CEO of the median firm in the
nondisclosure group saw pay rise by about 20% over the three-year
period before the use of a 10b5-1 plan, while the CEO of the median
firm in the disclosure group saw pay rise by about 40%. Already we
can see a difference between the pre-10b5-1 period and the 10b5-1
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period, where the pay of firms in the disclosure group increased less
than those in the nondisclosure group. And, unlike the case above,
performance seems to explain this difference. The firms in the
disclosure group outperform those in the nondisclosure group: market
value increased by 6% for the firms in the nondisclosure group and
15% for firms in the disclosure group; net income increased by about
20% for the firms in the nondisclosure group and nearly 27% for firms
in the disclosure group. In short, pay and performance seem roughly
correlated, unlike in the 10b5-1 period.
In both the 10b5-1 period and the pre-10b5-1 period, the firms
in the disclosure group saw market value grow by more than double
that of the firms in the nondisclosure group. 68 But compensation
changes differed across the two test periods. In the pre-10b5-1 period,
CEOs of disclosure firms, which outperformed nondisclosure firms,
saw their pay increase more than nondisclosure firms, while in the
10b5-1 period, CEOs of disclosure firms, which outperformed
nondisclosure firms, saw their pay increase less than nondisclosure
firms. This is consistent with the result that trading plans generate
implicit compensation in the 10b5-1 period but not in the pre-10b5-1
period. If the result in the 10b5-1 period were explainable by
unobservable differences across the two groups that were not related
to the 10b5-1 trading plans, we would expect similar differences in the
correlation between performance and pay over the two periods.
An unreported regression analysis of the determinants of pay
(following the same methodology as for the 10b5-1 period reported
above) confirms this result. Consistent with the findings above,
economic performance metrics, such as change in market value,
change in asset size, and change in net income, are positively
correlated with changes in pay, and all are statistically significant at
the one-percent level. 69 But, the disclosure dummy variable is not
statistically significant in the pre-10b5-1 period, as it is in the 10b5-1
period. This means while the firms in the disclosure group experience
68. In the pre-10b5-1 period, the median disclosure firm grew 2.6 times faster than the
median nondisclosure firm; in the 10b5-1 period, the median disclosure firm grew 2.2 times
faster than the median nondisclosure firm.

69. The coefficient for "market value" is positive (0.16) and is statistically significant at the
1% level (p-value < 0.01); the coefficient for "assets" is positive (0.36) and is statistically
significant at the 1%level (p-value < 0.01); and the coefficient for the "disclosure" dummy is not
statistically significant (0.61). The other coefficients are not statistically significant. This means
the typical determinants of pay (that is, market value and asset size) are significant
determinants of pay across the two groups of firms in the pre-10b5-1 period, but there is no
correlation between the fact of being in the groups and changes in pay over the period in
question.
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significant differences in pay compared with the nondisclosure group
in the period in which these firms are using 10b5-1 trading plans, the
two groups are the same in terms of the correlation between
performance and pay when they are not using these trading plans. In
essence, economic performance predicts pay before firms adopt 10b5-1
plans, but does not when they use these plans, because insiders using
them are earning implicit compensation from trading. This supports
the conclusion above that firms in the disclosure group take the
expected profits from the use of 10b5-1 plans into account when
setting CEO pay.

IV. DISCUSSION
The data presented above support the hypothesis that boards
bargain with executives about profits earned from trading in firm
shares. This is consistent with the earlier findings of Roulstone, who
presented data showing that restricting insider trading was associated
with an increase in pay for insiders. The empirical analyses presented
in this Article show that liberalizing opportunities for insider trading
is associated with a decrease in pay for insiders, relative to what it
would have been otherwise.
In addition, the results presented herein show the change in
pay based on the unwinding of trading restrictions is correlated with
the profits insiders are expected to make from informed trades. For
insiders at firms where prior work shows informed trading is more
likely and where, in expectation, insiders are likely to earn abnormal
returns from this trading, we see statistically significant differences in
pay compared with insiders at firms where prior work shows informed
trading is much less likely. In other words, there is evidence that
firms and executives bargain about insider-trading profits, both from
optimization trades and informed trades, and that these profits are
considered in meeting an executive's reservation wage.
The data suggest several interesting lines of inquiry. First, is
the bargaining about insider-trading profits complete or do managers
nevertheless exploit trading opportunities to extract more wealth from
shareholders? This question speaks to the literature on managerial
power versus optimal contracting in the setting of executive pay, as
well as the literature on the stickiness of wages. Second, what is the
legality of this implicit compensation as a matter of federal securities
law? Finally, what are the implications for board governance and
decisionmaking?
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A. The Completeness of Bargaining
The existence of implicit compensation appears to offer a
powerful counterargument to some scholars' claims that, on average,
boards and executives do not bargain at arm's length about pay. The
ability of CEOs to earn undisclosed profits from insider trading is a
central component of the managerial power theory of executive
compensation.70 Proponents of this theory, like Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse
Fried, and David Walker, observe that executives earn money by
selling shares, and then claim that executives "camouflage [insidertrading] transactions" from the board and shareholders in order to
earn compensation beyond what they deserve.7 1 They argue:
These [insider-trading] profits ... provide extra value to executives that does not show
up in any of the firm's accounting information or compensation figures disclosed to
the cost of these hidden insider trading profits to shareholders is
shareholders .... Thus,
72
likely to go unnoticed.

According to the managerial power theory, the board does not
know about insider-trading profits, and therefore cannot take them
into consideration in setting the executive's wage. 73 The result is that
the board may systematically overpay executives. Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker claim the existence of insider-trading profits is "difficult to
explain from an optimal contacting perspective, [but] is easily
'74
explained under the managerial power approach.
For the existence of trading profits to support the managerialpower hypothesis, their claim must be that the board does not take
even the possibility of insider-trading profits into account when
75
setting executive pay. If the board does take the profits into account,
the existence of insider-trading profits does not implicate the validity
of the pay-setting process, since the board would in fact be bargaining
with the executive, at some degree of arm's length. The insider-trading
profits may raise issues about the firm's compliance with accounting
and disclosure requirements of state corporate law and federal
70. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation,69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 831 (2002) (noting that the ability and freedom
of CEOs to earn undisclosed profits is better explained under a managerial power approach then
from an optimal contacting perspective).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. This may be true even if the board knows that insiders earn illegal profits on average,
since it may not know the profits made by particular executives and therefore may set the wage
too high.
74. Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 831.
75. This may be based on particular facts or based on a general average.
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securities laws, but they do not, without more, say anything about
whether the board did a good job for shareholders in bargaining over
executive pay. If it is true, however, that the board does not consent
and is not aware of these profits, it may support a claim about a
manager-dominated pay-setting process, since executives will be
76
systematically overpaid.
The data presented above are some evidence that boards are
aware of insiders' trading proclivities and ability to earn abnormal
returns, and bargain (albeit perhaps imperfectly) about these gains.
This bargaining is, however, not generally disclosed and may in fact
be surreptitious given the potential negative implications of the
underlying conduct. Although it may be rational for the board to
engage in this bargaining, disclosing it may be irrational, as it would
expose the executive and the firm to costs they do not otherwise have
to bear. This obviously raises issues about the completeness of firm
disclosures about pay and the efficacy of existing pay disclosure rules.
The managerial power theory may have some traction if
bargaining is not complete or even nearly so. But we can, based on
these data, reject the strong form of the managerial power thesis. For
the strong form to be true, there would have to be no difference in pay
across disclosure partitions. If there were no difference, we could
conclude that boards did not rationally reduce pay based on the ability
to earn abnormal returns. The evidence presented above suggests that
the boards did know and did offset executive pay to account for some
of these profits. So the strong form of the managerial power thesis
seems less plausible.
A weaker version of the managerial power theory, however,
might argue that bargaining exists but is incomplete, perhaps
woefully so. Say an insider is able to earn implicit compensation of
$100 from Rule 10b5-1 trades, but sees total explicit pay reduced by
only $10. This might suggest some managerial power over the paysetting process, although there are other competing explanations.
Economists generally view wages as sticky, although there are not
great theoretical explanations for why this is the case. 77 We are all
familiar with this phenomenon-lawyers, for instance, say that
starting salaries at big law firms rose dramatically during the dot-com
76. This argument is consistent with the view that information about a firm is the property
of the firm, and that insiders should not be able to appropriate it for their use without the
consent of the board.
77. For a useful summary of the debate, see BEWLEY, supra note 40, at 1-2 (concluding
based on interviews with over 300 business and labor figures that firms balance gains from
reduced wages against decreases in morale that might result).
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boom, but did not fall proportionately when the bubble burst. If
bargaining about insider-trading profits is incomplete, it may simply
be because of a similar phenomenon. There is some evidence for this in
the data. Executive salary across the disclosure partition does not
change much from pre- to post-plan years, but the number and value
of options do. Salaries may be sticky. Option value, on the other hand,
may not really be changing other than to say that the Black-Scholes
value does not capture the true value to the executive. Or, it may be
that the firm believes the trading profits are less valuable in
expectation than $100 from the firm's perspective. This may be
because of executive-specific risk from trading, from the value of
certain cash versus speculative profits, or for other reasons.
So what we need for a test of the completeness of bargaining is
some measure of the amount of implicit compensation (that is, the
amount of expected insider-trading profits) and the reductions in pay.
The ratio of these should provide a rough measure of the completeness
of bargaining. In the example above, a $10 reduction in pay for $100 in
expected profits (a ratio of 10%) would show greater managerial power
than a $90 reduction in pay for $100 in expected profits (a ratio of
90%). The data presented in this Article do not decisively answer the
question of the completeness of bargaining. But, combining the data
from this study and those from the HJM study allows us to do a backof-the-envelope calculation to estimate whether the offsets we observe
are greater than, less than, or equal to the expected profits from
insider trades under Rule 10b5-1 plans.
HJM report that the average insider sold about $8 million in
shares in the one-year period following the first observed disclosure of
a 10b5-1 plan trade.78 These are actual observed sales in the
marketplace. HJM also find the average insider was able to earn
abnormal returns of about 12% over a one-year period on these sales.
This means the average insider could earn about $1 million in
abnormal returns from these 10b5-1 trading plan sales. 79 This is
roughly equal to the amount of implicit compensation offset against
pay suggested by the regression coefficient for disclosure choice. 80 The
coefficient on the disclosure dummy (variable = 1 or 0) is -1,219, which
means disclosure (variable = 1) is associated with a reduction in pay of
about $1.2 million. This suggests a managerial power ratio of 80%.

78.
specific
79.
80.

See Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 43 tbl.2 (reporting supporting data on insiderstatistics).
$8 million times 12% equals $960,000.
See supra Table 5.
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There is some imprecision in both the estimate of the average trading
profits and the regression coefficient, so these estimates can be said to
be roughly equal. This is not conclusive evidence, and the estimates
are rough. But the magnitudes suggest that the offset in compensation
is within the range of expected profits insiders earn. It is much less
likely in light of these data that the offset is far less than the profits
insiders earn from informed trading. This suggests that the claims
about camouflaged profits being evidence of executive dominance of
the pay-setting process are much weaker than they appear.
B. Securities Law Issues
The existence of implicit compensation presents two large
securities law issues. The first issue is whether board recognition of
expected executive profits from informed trades runs afoul of insidertrading law. The second is whether implicit compensation is consistent
with existing federal disclosure laws and rules.
1. Insider Trading
This Article presents evidence showing that boards are aware
of profits insiders expect to make on the basis of informational
asymmetries. Although it was common knowledge before this study
that some insiders were earning abnormal returns,8 1 this study
documents that boards were aware that, in expectation, specific
insiders were likely to trade on inside information, and adjusted their
pay accordingly. Importantly, these trades may be illegal under
various insider-trading theories. Accordingly, we are confronted with
the issue of whether boards were in effect authorizing illegal conduct,
and whether this is a violation of securities laws.
Under the classical theory of insider trading, executives
trading in company stock on the basis of nonpublic information violate
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.8 2 The Supreme Court has held that the
executive's role of trust and confidence "gives rise to a duty to disclose
[or abstain from trading] because of the 'necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from... tak[ing] unfair advantage of... uninformed

81. See SEYHUN, supra note 19, at 5.
82. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-31 (1980) (summarizing settled case law
on question of company insiders trading on material informational advantage).
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• . . stockholders.' "83 By agreeing to implicitly pay executives with
profits from trading against outsiders with less information, the board
is in effect paying the executive with cash from future shareholders
instead of from current ones. Arguably, the board may also be taking
"unfair advantage" of these shareholders to reduce the cash expenses
of current shareholders.
If the insider were engaging in this conduct without board
approval, it would unquestionably be illegal under the classical theory
of insider trading. Executives trading on nonpublic information violate
federal securities laws. But there is something interesting about the
fact that the board authorized the trading and took it into account
when setting executive pay. These are not secret profits. The board
disclosed the fact that the executive was given shares, that the
executive was free to trade the shares, and that the trades would be
given extra protection against insider-trading liability by virtue of the
application of the affirmative defense provided by Rule 10b5-1. One
could argue that outsiders who traded in firm stock were on notice
about the possibility of informed trading by insiders. If this is true,
then it seems more difficult to say the insider was trading against
"uninformed stockholders." To be sure, the people they trade against
are uninformed about the specific facts-for example, a key drug will
not be approved and therefore the stock price will likely fall-but they
are arguably informed about the possibility of trading on this
information deficit. Prospective shareholders should thus be willing to
pay less for the shares based on the probability of trading at an
information disadvantage, and therefore the advantage of the insiders
would not be unfair, but would be paid for in advance.
This is just a way of saying that if the firm is internalizing the
costs of insider trading, say, by seeing its shares traded in less liquid
markets because of the risk of insider trading and therefore seeing its
cost of capital rise, then it is more difficult to make out the case for
regulation.8 There is some support for this in the Supreme Court's
insider-trading jurisprudence. In interpreting the "misappropriation
theory" of insider trading, the Court suggested that board

83. Id. at 228-29 (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951)).
84. Another argument for regulation is firm based. Firms might prefer broad insider
trading laws because of the inability of firms to commit to not trade on inside information. As a
result of this inability, all firms would face higher costs of capital, including firms whose insiders
were not trading.
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authorization might convert illegal into legal trading.85 The
misappropriation theory covers cases where the trader, such as a
lawyer working for the firm, could be deemed to have taken property
that belonged to the firm, in this case, the information about the price
decline, for personal use.8 6 In United States v. O'Hagan, a case
involving a lawyer using information from a partner about a pending
corporate takeover, the Court remarked in a footnote:
[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) liability when a person trading
on the basis of nonpublic information has disclosed his trading plans to, or obtained
authorization from, the principal-even though such conduct may affect the securities
87
markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by the misappropriation theory.

The case imagined in O'Haganis not even as strong as that of
implicit compensation, because in the former the world need not know
88
about the authorization, while in the latter it does.
There is no obvious reason why the authorization theory in
O'Hagan should not insulate classic trading as well. There is arguably
no deception in a case in which the firm discloses that insiders are
likely to be trading based on informational advantages. In fact, the
classical theory prescribes that insiders either disclose or abstain from
trading. Although the disclosure element is typically thought to
require disclosure of the facts underlying the trade, for example, the
discovery of an ore deposit, the generic disclosure about insider
propensity to trade on inside information may achieve the same kind
of price adjustment and cost internalization on average. There will be
cases in which the ex ante price difference will not turn out to
sufficiently compensate for the informational advantage, but the
outsiders would, on average, be compensated for this risk. The
argument for authorization as a prophylactic here is thus economic
instead of statutory.
This is especially true for diversified shareholders. As noted
above, paying implicit compensation is simply a wealth transfer from
future to current shareholders. Diversified shareholders are as likely
to be current shareholders of a firm as they are future shareholders of
85. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (stating that a person commits
fraud under the misappropriation theory by his "undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's
information" when he owes a fiduciary duty to that principal) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 652.
87. Id. at 659 n.9.
88. This assumes the Court did not require disclosure to take advantage of this defense. In
the Rule 10b5-1 context, the firm need not disclose. But as HJM show, the firms that do not
disclose generally do not see insiders earn abnormal returns. See Henderson et al., supra note 4,
at 23-27 (discussing correlation between insiders' returns from trading and the level of insiders'
disclosure).
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the firm, and therefore there should be no systematic wealth effects.
Shareholders who have to pay less for executive talent in one firm
have to pay more in another firm, simply by virtue of when they enter
89
the shareholder pool. On average, shareholders should be indifferent.
The other typical objection to insider trading is that it will
make markets less liquid and less efficient because individual
shareholders will not trust the market to be fair, viewing it instead as
a place for privileged individuals to extract wealth from less privileged
ones. This argument is weaker, however, in a world where the
possibility of trading is disclosed ex ante. If traders know about the
potential for informed insiders to be on the other side of a transaction,
this risk should be priced by the market, and the firm should
internalize these costs. In addition, the unfairness is ameliorated by
the fact that the insiders are paying for any insider-trading gains by
reducing other forms of compensation in approximately equal
amounts.
There are reasons to believe, however, that this economic story
does not hold up very well in the case of trading under Rule 10b5-1
plans. The argument for insider trading is premised on an assumption
that insider trades provide valuable information to the market and
therefore lead to more accurate short-term prices for securities. It is
puzzling, after all, that those with the most knowledge about a
security are the ones forbidden from trading on that information. So,
to take a classic example, if an insider knows that a secret geology
report shows a large mineral deposit on firm land, this allows the
insider to buy undervalued shares, moving the price upwards toward
the price it will be when the information is revealed. Improved pricing
accuracy helps ensure that capital is allocated efficiently in the
market and reduces the probability that trades made prior to the
public revelation of the information are made at inaccurate prices.90
These benefits might be especially valuable in the 10b5-1 case,
because disclosure of a pre-commitment to trade may provide the
insiders' information to the market well in advance of when it
89. For an argument that diversification cannot account for this risk for investors, see
Alicia J. Davis, Are Investors' Gains and Losses from Securities FraudEqual Over Time? Theory
and Evidence 4-6 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 09-002, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1121198.
90. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 5, at 61 (stating that outsiders benefit from insider trading
since "the market value of the shares held by people who may know nothing whatever of the new
information has increased" as a result of the trading); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading,
in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772, 774 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerritt De Geest
eds., 2000) (noting that "the market reacts to the insiders' trades and gradually moves toward
the correct price').
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otherwise would. The attenuation from the time of the trade may cut
the other way, however, since plan initiation is a very noisy signal
about values at some unknown future time. When an insider trades
based on inside information, an outsider observing this trade may
confidently conclude that the price is unlikely to rise in the near
future. For pre-commitment trades, however, this is not true, and this
fact will diminish the value of the insider's disclosure. For example, if
the stock price of Acme Inc. is $10 on January 1, and the CEO enters
into a 10b5-1 plan with planned sales sometime over the next year, it
is possible that the CEO knows that the stock is likely to rise to $30 by
June before falling on bad news to $5 in September. This means that
it is only the insider's trade, and not the insider's disclosure, that is
likely to be valuable in the way that proponents of insider-trading
legalization argue is beneficial.
These benefits, however, may be reduced for informed trades
made through 10b5-1 trading plans. Consider the two scenarios
discussed by HJM: trades based on uncertain future bad news (where
firms make limited disclosures) and trades based on certain long-term
bad news (where firms make specific disclosures). In the first scenario,
the trades contain no easily discernable information about a firm's
future stock price. An insider with very high (but not perfect)
confidence about future good news might use a 10b5-1 trading plan as
insurance against even very unlikely bad news, since the insider can
terminate planned trades based on newly received information that
the good state of the world will result. Given the relatively costless
option embedded in the current formulation of the Rule, the only thing
that can be discerned from a firm entering into a plan that is
sometime many months in the future, an insider believes there is a
nonzero chance that the firm might have some bad news. While this
may be somewhat valuable, rarely are outsiders 100% confident about
a firm's future, and the additional value of a 10b5-1 trading plan is
therefore near zero. After all, it might be that the insider believes
there is a 1% chance of bad news in six months, which would hardly be
enough to move the market price.
The fact that HJM find no discernable market reaction to
insider's disclosure of the existence of 10b5-1 trading plans supports
this conclusion. The data show that the market does not consider the
disclosure of a 10b5-1 trading plan to be a meaningful signal about the
value of a firm's future stock price. One-, three-, and five-day
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding disclosure are all
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indistinguishable from zero. 91 This is because disclosure is a very
noisy signal. It may be viewed as providing some or all of the following
litigation prophylactic benefits, a signal of good governance, or a
negative prediction about the future value of the firm's stock price
92
that is different from zero, but not measurably so.
In the other scenario, an insider makes a specific disclosure
based on a strong belief about negative news in the future, likely of
quite large magnitude. This type of disclosure is much more
meaningful in terms of information provided to the market, because it
is not an option but a sure bet about the future stock price. 93 There are
some problems, however, even with this. First, even these disclosures
are noisy, since, as noted above, not all specific disclosures evince a
belief about future value. Based on an examination of the specific
disclosure cases identified by HJM, it is apparent that about half of
the specific disclosures observed were benign in nature and provided
no prediction about future value. This could be because the insider
making the disclosure did so for nonstrategic reasons, such as risk
aversion or a belief in disclosure as an inherent good. Whatever the
case, the value of any disclosure is reduced.
The disclosure might still be valuable, since outsiders could
now deduce that there is, say, a 50% chance of a large drop in the
stock price within one year. But this isn't socially valuable
information, although it may be privately valuable to outsiders. The
private value is obvious from the data: an outsider could have sold
short a portfolio of firms that made specific disclosures, and the data
suggest that it would have earned a nearly 25% abnormal return
within one year. Without other observable data that would allow an
outsider to distinguish between opportunistic and benign disclosures,
however, any information gains would be offset (fully or mostly) by
information losses from the firms that are accurately priced at the
time of disclosure. This would be so if, as it likely is the case, there are
costs imposed on individual firms and the market as a whole that are
not captured by the net economics of a portfolio of shorting
transactions. So, although there may be some information value, its
quality will be degraded such that it may be (and is likely to be)
insufficient to justify the costs of the Rule.
91. Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 39 fig.2.
92. There may be some threshold confidence level (of certainty times magnitude) below
which entering into a plan is too costly, but given the ease and low cost of entering into these
plans, this must be very, very low.
93. See Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 39 fig.2 (showing a strong correlation between
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and specific-disclosure sales).
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In summary, the biggest criticism of Rule 10b5-1 plans along
this dimension seems to be that they allow insiders to trade closer in
time to when the information will be disclosed to the market anyway,
thus reducing the value of price correction that comes with insider
trading. As shown above, the litigation prophylactic value of the plans
means the risk of prosecution is lower for trades made by an executive
on a particular day. Imagine a disclosure that will be made on May 1,
and the executive is somewhat confident about it on March 1. In a
world without trading plans, the insider will want to trade on the
information as soon as possible, because the closer in time the trade is
to May 1, the more likely the liability for insider trading. Trading
plans, however, allow the insider to enter into the plan on March 1,
and to plan the trade much closer to May 1, even April 30, with the
ability to update (for example, cancel the planned trades) as
confidence increases. This reduces the information component of
insider trades and the price-accuracy component of insider trading.
So while there is a plausible story about how this type of
implicit compensation would help reduce some of the problems of
insider trading and therefore be an efficient component of executive
pay, a more careful consideration of how the Rule works in practice
shows how the informational value of insider trades may be much
lower in the case of 10b5-1 trades. The Rule does, however, make
insider trading more likely, as HJM show, and in ways that seem to be
neutral from the perspective of shareholders. 94 Under current law,
however, this puts boards into an extremely difficult situation. We will
return to this below.
2. Disclosure
Another related issue that the existence of this type of implicit
compensation presents is the adequacy of disclosures about executive
compensation. The SEC requires firms to disclose, in extensive detail,
the compensation of the CEO and other top executives. In a recent
change to increase the amount of disclosure, the SEC wrote that the
rules are "intended to provide investors with a clearer and more
complete picture of the compensation earned by a company's principal
executive officer." 95 But the rules do not require disclosure about
94. See Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 27 (summarizing empirical analyses and noting
that "trading plans may actually enhance insiders' strategic trade potential because of the
reduced litigation risk").
95. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 338732A, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-
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executives' implicit compensation, and, as shown above, this may be
significant in terms of dollar amounts and the legality of this form of
compensation.
In terms of stock options and grants, the current rules require
that shares be reported at fair market value as of the date of the
grant. 96 The grant date fair value is determined by accounting rule
FAS 123R, under which stock is valued at its market price and options
are reported in terms of their Black-Scholes value.97 The value of
options under the Black-Scholes formula, however, is based on the
value of any option with the characteristics of the one held by the
executive. The option value does not consider the value to a particular
executive based on that executive's personal or firm-imposed
circumstances. For instance, the Black-Scholes value of an option to
buy a share of stock in General Electric is the same whether Joe Q.
Public holds the share or GE's CEO Jeffrey Immelt holds it. But Mr.
Immelt and Mr. Public are in very different positions vis-A-vis the
ability to convert that option to cash and the ability to, and likelihood
of, beating the market based on superior information.
Consider three firms: Firm A restricts executives from trading
until they retire, unless given approval by the board of directors; Firm
B permits executives to trade, but not during blackout windows of
sixty days prior to earnings announcements; and Firm C allows
executives to trade at any time. All else being equal, each of these
firms will report the exact same Black-Scholes value, despite the fact
that the executives will have widely different individual valuations.
This difference arises because the ability to trade is valuable to
executives, as is shown in the data presented above. Implicit
compensation arises because the reported value of an executive's
equity compensation does not necessarily (if ever) represent the
expected value the executive is likely to receive from the equity when
it is converted to cash. If the option value as reported to shareholders
is perfectly realized by the executive, then implicit compensation is
zero, and the issue fades away. We know, however, that valuations
vary significantly from realized gains.

27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,158. (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2010).
97. See FIN. STANDARDS ACCOUNTING BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT No. 123 (rev. 2004),
available at http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsuml23r.shtml. Rule 123R allows firms discretion to
choose among a variety of valuation methodologies, but the Black-Scholes vale is the most
common.
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The market roughly tracks the three examples above, with
some firms imposing no restrictions on trading, some banning it, and
most falling somewhere in between. In general these policies are not
publicly available, but can be inferred only through observing firm
trading behaviors in detail. There is no requirement to disclose the
existence of blackout windows or the use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans.
In theory firms have incentives to disclose this, since presumably the
reason for the policy is that it increases firm value. But when this
theoretical view interacts with insider-trading law as applied, it may
no longer be the case that firms have incentive to disclose the
existence of blackout windows or the use of 10b5-1 plans. Given the
value to insiders from the ability to trade, the heterogeneity in firm
policies about trading, the relative paucity of information about
specific firm policies, and -the imperfection in legal enforcement of
insider-trading law, we cannot accurately calculate the value of
implicit compensation from publicly available information. 98 After all,
firms will not disclose the size of profits insiders earn from informed
trades, although they may take these into consideration when setting
insider pay. Moreover, if the bargaining is imperfect, insiders may be
able to use their power over the board to earn more than their
marginal contribution to firm value.
So we have a situation in which the reported value of executive
compensation is not an accurate reflection of the actual compensation
bargain, and arguably even the public disclosure of the circumstances
leading to the divergence may be insufficient for the market to
accurately determine the true value of pay. Although this problem
existed prior to Rule 10b5-1, the Rule increases the magnitude and
frequency of implicit compensation that can be earned.
But it is not at all obvious that this is problematic. Even if it is
true that the market cannot perfectly determine individual executives'
total pay (explicit plus implicit compensation), the role of the board in
the labor market seems to provide a check on any abuse by the
executives from the lack of transparency. Remember, Bebchuk and
Fried's objection was not that insiders earn profits from trading, but
98. If Firm A, Firm B, and Firm C all report compensation in cash and securities to their
CEOs of $1 million, but do not publicly disclose the trading restrictions they impose, we cannot
know the CEOs' expected compensation. We can reasonably assume that the ability to trade is
worth something to executives, either based simply on liquidity or the ability to time trades
based on private information. So, if Firm C imposes no restrictions on trading, Firm B imposes
standard blackout windows, and Firm A bans all trades, holding all else equal, we can predict
that the CEO of Firm C will be able to earn more compensation in a given year than the CEO of
Firm B, who will in turn be able to earn more compensation in a given year than the CEO of
Firm A. But if this is not disclosed, the market cannot know this.
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that they allegedly earn secret profits from trading.9 9 If bargaining
over implicit compensation is relatively complete, as shown above,
then shareholders should be largely indifferent to the shortcomings of
disclosure rules to capture implicit compensation. Shareholders may
see pay reductions that are not actually pay reductions, but there may
be recognition in the market about this offset. In addition, unless
shareholders are inclined to act on this reduction, it is not clear what
harm flows from this for shareholders.
There may be reasons why shareholders or society care about
absolute levels of pay irrespective of performance, however, and
disclosure rules may capture these as well in a world of implicit
compensation. For instance, pay tables disclosed by firms may show
total pay of $10 million, but the compensation bargain may reflect a
market wage of $12 million, with $2 million coming from trading
profits. As noted above, while this form of compensation existed before
Rule 10b5-1, the Rule changes the size of the difference and the
number of firms paying substantial amounts in this way.
The easiest way to solve this problem is to require firms to
disclose, in summary form, profits from insiders' trades. These data
are already available to some extent, because insiders are required to
disclose changes to their ownership of equity on Form 4 within two
business days after any transactions. Those interested can calculate
these amounts in rough terms. But these data are not summarized as
part of the SEC's handy summary tables that firms are required to
disclose. Adding a line for "profits from insider sales in the prior year"
would be a helpful addition to the SEC's disclosure requirements.
Given the questionable legality of the practice of implicit
compensation, requiring more disclosure of it may simply stamp it out,
and this may or may not be a good thing. After all, if insiders are
going to trade anyway, making them give back some money as a result
seems like a sensible policy.
An alternative is to increase the transparency of trading
activities. Simply requiring more disclosure of the use of 10b5-1 plans
is not an obvious solution. The SEC could reconsider the proposal it
tabled that would have required firms to disclose the existence of a
plan used by any executive within two days of adoption using a Form
8-K disclosure. Disclosure sounds benign in the abstract-who can be
opposed to having more information about the use of plans?-but the
data suggest that it may backfire and have unintended consequences.
Remember that the firms and insiders least likely to be abusing the
99.

BEBCHUK& FRIED, supranote 11, at 8.
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Rule are the ones not making any disclosures of the existence of their
plans. These firms and insiders choose not to disclose for some reason,
and therefore requiring them to do so would likely increase their costs
of using a plan. We should therefore expect fewer firms and insiders in
this group to enter into plans on the margin, with the result of
removing some of the benefits of the Rule without changing any of the
costs.
C. Corporate Governance
The payment of implicit compensation seems consistent with
the well-accepted board goal of maximizing firm value. As mentioned
above, the board is reducing payments by current shareholders (and
thus increasing firm value by that amount) as a result of executives'
ability to earn profits from trades against outsiders. The optimization
component of implicit compensation, what Roulstone estimates at
about 13% of total pay, is unobjectionable from any perspective.
Giving executives the ability to trade, and offsetting their pay in an
amount equal to their expected gains, is a Pareto improvement, since
current shareholders pay less for executive talent and future
shareholders receive shares in a bargain in which no side of the
transaction is expected to outperform the other. The SEC had this
win-win situation in mind when it passed Rule 10b5-1.
The inability to limit Rule 10b5-1 to optimization trades,
however, complicates board decisionmaking. From the perspective of
current shareholders the payment of implicit compensation for
informed trades may not only make economic sense but it may also be
imperative. As discussed above, allowing insiders to trade, including
on inside information, may be the cheapest way to pay, considering all
costs, including potential legal costs. This may be because the board
makes the deliberate calculation of the costs and benefits of restricting
trading. Or it may simply be because the board believes it is powerless
to prevent insiders from trading, since there are no legal duties for it
to monitor executives' private behavior and, in any event, such
attempts may be very expensive and fruitless. In either case, if the
board is aware that executives are earning abnormal returns from
trading and the board is unable to efficiently prevent them from doing
so, it is perfectly rational for the board to reduce the expected costs of
such trading (that is, authorize the use of 10b5-1 trading plans) and
offset pay as a result of expected gains.
The problem arises because the board is arguably complicit in
the executives' illegal activity. For instance, we wouldn't defend a
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board decision for a pharmaceutical firm to sell heroin, even if it was
based on a business judgment that the benefits exceeded the costs.
The same would be true of board actions designed to conceal the
CEO's hobby of robbing banks. In this case, the board is not
necessarily aiding and abetting the illegal trades, but it does have the
power to make such trades much less likely. The board could, for
instance, have a policy banning the insider from trading or from using
a 10b5-1 plan, either of which would make it much less likely that the
insider would be able to earn abnormal returns from informed trades.
This decision would undoubtedly raise the costs of management talent
for current shareholders, but it would reduce the probability that
future shareholders would be defrauded. As mentioned above, this
may be a bargain that even future shareholders might not want. This
is because diversified shareholders are as likely to be current
shareholders as future ones, and implicit compensation may
encourage the optimal level of risk taking.
To see why what we can call "insider insurance" embedded in
Rule 10b5-1 plans might be efficient and desirable for shareholders,
consider the following example. Sue, the CEO of Acme Inc., has one
hundred shares of vested stock trading at $10 per share. Sue has the
choice of two projects: Project A has a 70% chance of increasing the
stock price to $15 in one year, and a 30% chance of decreasing the
stock price to $8 over the same period; Project B has a 70% chance of
increasing the stock price to $20, and a 30% chance of decreasing the
stock price to zero. Diversified, risk-neutral shareholders prefer
Project B, because its expected value ($14) exceeds that of Project A
($13).101 Sue, however, prefers Project A, since the 30% chance of
failure in Project B will result in not only economic losses, but also
likely her job. Here, we see classic agency cost problems-managers'
interests are not fully aligned with those of shareholders.
The early termination option embedded in Rule 10b5-1,
however, can help align these incentives by increasing the economic
returns to Sue from choosing Project B, perhaps enough to overcome
the potential of losing her job. To see this, consider Sue's payoffs from
the sale of all her stock at the end of one year. Pre-Rule, Sue would
earn $290 from Project A and $400 from Project B. 011 Although based
100. These expected values are simply the stock price for each state of the world times the
probability of that state of the world (that is, for Project A: 70% x $15 + 30% x $8 = $13; and for
Project B: 70% x $20 + 30% x $0 = $14).
101. For Project A, Sue earns $500 in the good state of the world ($15-$10 x 100 shares),
which occurs 70% of the time; and -$200 in the bad state of the world ($8-$10 x 100 shares),
which occurs 30% of the time. The sum of these is expected values is $290 ($350 + (-$60) = $290).
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on purely stock profits Sue would prefer Project B (along with
shareholders), Sue's risk aversion with respect to her job may mean
this monetary difference is insufficient to persuade her to choose
Project B.
With the Rule, however, Sue can earn more from Project B,
maybe even enough to overcome her expected losses from employment.
Her payoffs increase to $350 from Project A but even more so to $700
from Project B. This is because she can avoid any losses from the 30%
bad states of the world by planning sales trades in advance and then
letting them execute in the bad states of the world or terminating
them in the good states of the world. 10 2 In other words, choosing
Project B increases Sue's expected payoffs by 38% in the pre-Rule
world, but over 100% in the world with the Rule. Whether or not this
increased economic return will be sufficient to overcome a CEO's risk
aversion with respect to employment will vary by firm, by individual,
and over time, but ceteris paribus, the existence of the Rule helps
align shareholder and manager interests. 103
But it seems clear that implicit compensation is a bargain that
is illegal under current law. In addition, the use of Rule 10b5-1 as a
way of increasing trading may be less desirable than simple
legalization of insider trading, because it increases not only the
frequency of optimization trades but also the possibility of informed
trades, and without the salutary effects of plain-vanilla insider
trading. So the issue about the efficiency of board governance simply
goes back to the debate about the legalization of insider trading
generally.
The data reveal three final points worth making about board
governance. First, the amount of implicit compensation is not

For Project B, Sue earns $1000 in the good state of the world ($20-$10 x 100 shares), which
occurs 70% of the time; and -$1000 in the bad state of the world ($0-$10 x 100 shares), which
occurs 30% of the time. The sum of these expected values is $400 ($700 + (-$300) = $400).
102. For Project A, Sue earns the same as in the pre-Rule case for the good state of the world
($350), but in the bad state of the world, she can avoid the $60 in expected losses by planning
trades at $10 per share in advance, and letting them execute when the probabilities resolve
themselves (but are not publicly disclosed) in a negative way. Sue's expected value from
Project A is thus $350. For Project B, Sue earns the same as in the pre-Rule case for the good
state of the world ($1000), but in the bad state of the world, she can avoid the $300 in expected
losses through insider insurance. Sue's expected value from Project B is thus $700.
103. A related point is that insiders may be less likely to surreptitiously unwind equity
incentives they have been given through derivatives or other hedging transactions. For these
reasons, many of which will be firm-specific, any general reform may be overinclusive and
destructive of social welfare.
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correlated with the level of insider ownership.'0 4 This suggests that
manager power over the pay-setting process in this case is not
influenced significantly by how much of the firm is owned by the CEO.
The dataset includes firms with significant ownership stakes. Yet
there is no evidence that these CEOs are more likely to dominate the
board in a way that increases their ability to extract economic rents
from shareholders.
Second, the amount of implicit compensation is not correlated
with the level of institutional ownership. Numerous studies purport to
show a positive influence of the existence of large, institutional
shareholders on board governance.10 5 The fact that large blockholders,
especially activist ones, serve a salutary function in board
decisionmaking is practically a truism in academic legal circles. But
there is no obvious answer about what is "better" in the case of insider
trading. From the perspective of shareholders, the efficient answer
may be to encourage insiders to violate the law. In support of this
claim, this study finds no significant role of institutional investors in
the decision to adopt Rule 1b05-1 trading plans or to pay implicit
compensation. 10 6 It is also possible that institutional shareholders
were unaware of the issues. This is supported somewhat by the fact
that there was no significant market reaction to the disclosure of Rule
10b5-1 trading plans.
Finally, the data suggest that the board was relatively better
informed about the expected use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans than the
SEC, who wrote the rule. If we take the SEC at its word that Rule
10b5-1 was intended to encourage optimization trades but not
informed trades, then the SEC made a mistake-the Rule encourages
both types of trades. The evidence in this Article suggests that boards
were aware of this potential in the Rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article provides evidence that boards and executives
bargain about pay in ways not previously realized. Exploiting the

104. In unreported regressions, the independent variable "percent insider ownership" is
statistically insignificant.
105. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985,
1006-09 (1993) (reporting empirical studies purporting to show "mildly positive relationship
between active large-block shareholders and corporate performance").
106. In unreported regressions, the independent variable "percent institutional ownership" is
statistically insignificant.
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propensity to trade on insider information revealed by disclosure
choice in applying a recent SEC rule, the data show executives who
are more likely to earn abnormal returns see their pay reduced
relative to insiders who do not expect to earn abnormal returns. From
this, we can conclude several things. First, executive wages are not
completely sticky. Just as wages rise when trading options are
restricted, as shown by Roulstone, so too do wages fall when trading
options are liberalized. Second, boards bargain not only about
opportunities for diversification and optimization trades, but also
about profits from informed trades. Since these trades are likely
illegal under current law, this raises issues about potential board
liability for engaging in what may be a rational and efficient firm
strategy, but that may have social costs. Third, the bargain struck
between boards and executives about informed trades seems to
approximately offset any expected gains. This means that the implicit
compensation bargain is more consistent with the theory of optimal
contracting about executive pay than with the theory of managerial
power. Finally, although the data may say good things about the paybargaining environment, the case for permitting this sort of trading to
continue is quite weak. Whatever benefits exist from a liberal insidertrading regime are reduced in situations where insiders use Rule
10b5-1 plans.

